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Abstract 
Some understandings of European Union health law are based on a presumption of law as a 
static and closed system. This approach to the Union as a legal entity has important 
ramifications. The Union is a political system created by and subject to the rule of law. Its 
successes (and failures) are attributable to the legalisation of solving externalities and ensuring 
Member State solidarity, to gain benefits from integration. Member States, which create and 
sustain the Union by repeated acts of sovereign choice, choose to subject themselves to the rule 
of (Union) law. That protects both the Member States and the Union institutions (imperfectly, 
but nonetheless) from charges of illegitimacy. While recognising the benefits of such an 
approach to EU integration and lawmaking, we take the view that law also has an important 
dynamic potential.  That dynamic potential is inherent in all law, for law is embodied in text, 
and always open to interpretation, as the external contexts that give legal text meaning in the 
real-world change through time. We trace the dynamic potential of Union health law, by 





Theres a caricature of European Studies conversations that goes something like this:1  
 
Intergovernmentalist:  
The European Union integration is simply driven by political preferences, as a vehicle 
for the move of the Member State governments towards integration and its benefits. 
Neo-functionalist: 
No seriously, European Union integration in one policy area creates a drive toward 
more integration in surrounding policy areas that are functionally related, that is the 
true dynamic of EU integration. 
Institutionalist:  
No, it isnt. The Unions unique institutional structures create political preferences 
which drive the integration process, independently of the political will or whims of 
Member State governments. 
Multi-level governance scholar:  
No, it isnt. The integration process happens through interactions between national and 
European institutions and their political preferences. 
Legal scholar:  
Excuse me  what about the law? The Union is founded on the rule of law, and political 
integration only takes place where it is legally permitted or mandated. The Unions 
successes are attributable to the legalisation of preventing free-rider behaviours, so as 
to secure the benefits of integration. Member States, which create and sustain the Union 
by repeated acts of sovereign choice, choose to subject themselves to the rule of (Union) 
law. Union law mandates that health policy is a national matter. 
All, except the legal scholar: 
The law? That isnt relevant at all! 
 
In this caricature, the main characters may disagree with each other, but they all agree that law 
is only one factor in explaining the European Union and the integration processes for which it 
                                               
1 This is an obvious simplification of these theories and explanations of EU integration. Our understanding of 
the EUs involvement in health is greatly indebted to these understandings. See, seminally, B Rosamond, 
Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 
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is responsible. As legal scholars, we (perhaps surprisingly) agree with the main characters, if 
law is understood as a closed and inflexible factor in the structures of the Union, and the 
integration processes for which the Union is responsible. But we disagree with this type of 
understanding of law, as a fixed feature in the amalgam of political, institutional and social 
processes that shape EU integration.  For us, (Union) law is far from a static or closed system, 
that gets meaning through text and context. It is imbued with dynamic potential. This dynamic 
potential is important when we consider the future of EU health law and policy.2 
 
In this commentary, understanding law as situated and having a dynamic potential, we both 
explain the history of European Union health law and policy (section 1), and project its 
trajectories into the future (section 2). We mainly recount these as stories of some success and 
opportunity: Union health law and policy, though far from perfect, has done much to contribute 
to the health of Europes people(s) and to protect European ways of organising both public 
health and national health systems. But Union laws dynamic potential also has a dark side, 
which we explore in section 3. This leads us to our conclusion that the dynamic potential of 
Union health law is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of a future European health Union 
that genuinely and legitimately protects and promotes good health. 
 
For the purposes of this commentary, we define the scope of Union health law and policy as 
follows: it is a body of legal rules and policy provisions which mandate, incentivise or 
otherwise regulate certain actions, or the refraining from certain actions, in the provision of 
human health care and the protection of public health.3 This is a wide definition. It encompasses 
many fields of governmental activity that overlap with, or can be conceptualised as, other 
policy or legal fields. But it owes its coherence to the fundamental nature of human health and 
its relationship with human flourishing and well-being. Without health protection, other human 
activities, be they economic, social, cultural, simply cannot take place.  
 
Our approach and method is socio-legal in a broad sense, and cross-disciplinary: we are 
interested not only in the relevant legal texts (which for us occupy a central methodological 
                                               
2 In this commentary we were asked to provide a broad stroke analysis of the past and future of EU law and 
policy. For full details of the legal instruments to which we refer, please see A de Ruijter, EU Health Law and 
Policy: The Expansion of EU Power in Public Health and Health Care (Oxford: OUP, 2019); TK Hervey and 
JV McHale, European Union Health Law: Themes and Implications (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) and TK Hervey 
and JV McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) 
3 See de Ruijter, 2019, (n 2). 
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space), but also in their actual and potential effects in practice. We draw and refer to knowledge 
of appropriate qualitative and quantitative social science research. But our key methodological 
departure point is that legal text is situated and context-specific. When it comes to the health 
law and policy space, legal text creates opportunities for limiting and expanding policy and 
legal developments that are not obvious if looking only at the literal or previously-understood 
interpretations of legal text.4  
 
 
1. History of EU competences in health 
From the inception of the Union in the Coal and Steel Community and then the European 
Economic Community there was no formal legislative basis for health law and policy. 5  And 
yet, there was European health law and policy. In the context of the common agricultural policy 
 which was fundamentally concerned with ensuring that (western) Europe did not starve again, 
as it had in the 1940s  communicable disease control was implemented to ensure that milk 
that was traded across borders was free of bovine tuberculosis. Furthermore, there was access 
to cross-border health benefits for steel workers; and the European-level rules on 
pharmaceuticals marketing were adopted to avoid a repeat of the Thalidomide tragedy. But 
there were also Europe against Cancer and then a Europe against AIDS programme 
installed, to tackle the some of the most serious non-communicable and communicable diseases 
facing its populations at the time. Legally dubious,6 as the Union then lacked formal power to 
establish such programmes of training, information exchange, and research,  these programmes 
could be understood as based on Article 2 EEC, establishing the raising of the standard of 
living as a Union objective, and Article 235 EEC, giving competence to meet objectives where 
no more specific power was given in the Treaties. However, rather than lawmakers per se, it 
was also the health elites that would find linkage on health-related issues where cross-border 
exchange of expertise were seen as an advantage for health-related objectives. Union law and 
institutions, whether there was a legislative basis or not, provided a framework that was flexible 
enough to give some formality to these interactions without making them more binding than 
any law maker at the time would have felt comfortable with vis a vis its own electorate. This 
is an example of one feature of the dynamic potential of Union law: if there is no political 
                                               
4 For an example of the method, see TK Hervey, Re-Judging social rights in the EU in G De Burca, C 
Kilpatrick and J Scott, Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance (Oxford: Hart, 2014) 347. 
5 For simplicity, we use Union throughout this article, although it is not legally correct. 
6 Hervey and McHale, 2004, (n 2), 73. 
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opposition mobilised, then Union action can be based on very loose and surprising 
interpretations of the relevant legal texts, with scant judicial oversight of those interpretations. 
 
1993 saw the entry into force of the first formal Union health competence, under the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Then Article 129 EC provided a power for the Union to contribute towards a high 
level of human health protection by encouraging cooperation between Member States, and, if 
necessary, lending support to their action. Health here is a prime example of the paradox that 
epitomises EU integration when it comes to legislative competence. Some Member States felt 
a specific legal basis for Union health law would be good to limit the increasing activity and 
interest by Union (supranational) law-makers in the topic, while other Member States felt that 
a formal legal basis would create a good platform for intensifying some of the activity that was 
already taking place in the field.7 Action of the Union institutions was to be focused on specific 
areas, in particular major health scourges, research into those diseases, and health education 
and information.  
 
Substantively, the focus here was collectively-determined health (public health), rather than 
individual protection of health (health care) or governance of health care systems. Most 
importantly, Union action was to be limited to coordination and incentivisation of national 
action, and harmonisation of national law with respect to public health was explicitly excluded 
in the legal text. The specific prohibition on harmonisation of national laws, in the legal text 
that attributes legislative powers to the EU, underlines the paradox that was part of the health 
competence from its inception. Also, at the time, the attribution and subsidiarity principles were 
well enshrined within EU law. Hence, a health-specific recitation of a prohibition on 
harmonising national laws would seem excessive. However, it is exactly that push and pull that 
forms the basis for the further dynamics that became the breeding ground for the development 
of EU health law and policy.  
 
Article 129 EC and its successors gave the basis for further action programmes, which 
eventually became the Unions various public health programmes,8 and, most recently the 
proposed EU4Health programme.9 The provision in Article 129 EC was amended, and 
                                               
7 Hervey and McHale, 2004 (n 2). 
8 ibid 74 et seq. 
9 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Establishment of a 
Programme for the Unions Action in the Field of Health for the Period 2021-2027 and Repealing Regulation 
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renumbered at Article 152 EC, by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999; 
and again renumbered at Article 168 TFEU, by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force 
in 2009. Several textual changes strengthened the Unions powers in the field of health. Union 
activities were no longer limited to the prevention of disease, but expanded to include 
promotion of good health. Arguably, all Treaty changes in the field of health are related to 
constitutional moments and public health crisis. In 1992 the Tobacco advertising litigation saga 
and the HIV/Aids pandemic form important backdrops of the discussion during the Maastricht 
Treaty amendments. At the time of the Amsterdam amendments, the BSE crisis had just put 
enormous political pressure on Member States to come with a Union answer. In 2008 there 
had been the Anthrax scare in 2001, followed by the birdflu, SARS and a number of other 
public health scares.  
 
Hence in the Lisbon Treaty amendments in 2008, the obligation on the Union institutions was 
strengthened from merely contributing to a high level of human health protection to an 
obligation to ensure a high level of human health protection in all Union activities. This 
mainstreaming obligation, now reflected in Articles 9 and 168 TFEU, is a key aspect of the 
dynamic potential of the competence provisions of Union health law and policy. It has been 
understood as a response to the argumentation of the UK government in Case C-180/96/R UK 
v Commission concerning the emergency measures taken by the Union against the UK to stop 
the spread of BSE. 10  The UK argued that the measures, which restricted export of British 
meat, were adopted on the basis of protecting the beef market, and did not take account of 
actions taken by the UK to eliminate risk, or of products for which the risk of BSE was not at 
the time established, hence were unlawful. The essence of the Courts reasoning was that the 
protection of public health is a duty of all Union institutions, which cannot be disregarded in 
the pursuit of other Union policies such as free movement of goods or the common agricultural 
policy. The Court in this case implicitly recognised the centrality of human health to all Union 
activity, on the basis of its reading of the Treaty texts as a whole. The revised Treaty included 
this provision in its account of Union competence. This is an example of a second feature of 
the dynamic potential of law: in this case, the tensions implicit in legal text meant that the law 
got ahead of the politics. Consequently, this paves the road for Member States to embody a 
catch-up in a Treaty revision. 
                                               
(EU) No 282/2014 (EU4Health Programme) (COM(2020) 405 Final) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/com_2020_405_en_act_v11.pdf>. 
10 R Geyer, Exploring European Social Policy (Cambridge: Polity, 2000) 175. 
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The BSE case also serves as an example of the dynamic potential of Union law is its 
amenability to use by litigants seeking to secure market access in another, or even their home, 
Member State, or otherwise to challenge domestic law or policy. The direct effect and 
supremacy of the provisions securing free movement of the factors of production in the internal 
market has led to de facto Union health law making in a wide range of aspects of national health 
systems, including cross-border access of patients to medical treatments. Sometimes, because 
of waiting times or costs in the home Member State, or occasionally  because of ethical or other 
differences in the basket of care available at home, resulting in changes to domestic practices 
or provision;11 restrictions on pharmaceutical sales conditions that inter alia have an effect on 
pharmaceutical pricing or on ready access to pharmaceuticals for patients; access of health 
professionals such as dentists, ophthalmologists or pharmacists to markets in other Member 
States (or even in their home Member State), opening up cartels based on professional 
exclusion; and access of aspiring medical professionals to training opportunities. Union law on 
equality or non-discrimination has been relied upon to challenge national rules about blood 
donation; Union competition law to challenge hospital mergers; and so on. The logics of Union 
law reach deep into the logics of national health systems, disrupting their territorial bases, and 
creating new efficiencies and opportunities. 
 
The standard response in Union law to the deregulation inherent in such internal market or 
other litigation is to re-regulate at Union level by adopting harmonised law. Here, in Union 
health law we run against a classical constitutional tension, that is amplified in health as a result 
of the legal text in Article 168(5) and (7) TFEU. The key constraints to the Unions competence 
provisions in health reiterate that there is no Union power to harmonise national law or policy 
in order to protect or improve human health, or directly to protect public health.12  But this 
apparent no harmonisation in health policy rule does not mean what it seems to mean. In fact, 
this apparent constraint upon Union action is not reflected in Union health law and policy as it 
developed through the 1990s, 2000 and 2010s. The Union has adopted many harmonising 
measures in health law and policy, deploying other legal bases within the Treaties, principally 
                                               
11 See the case study of Watts in T Hervey, EU Health Law in C Barnard and S Peers, eds, EU Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 2020 forthcoming), chapter 21. 
12 Note the exceptions for substances of human origin (Article 168 (4) (a)); public health protections in 
veterinary and phytosanitary rules (Article 168 (4)(b)) and medicines and medical devices (Article 168 (4) (c)). 
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the power to create and sustain the Unions internal market.13 Safety of medicines, medical 
devices and equipment, blood and human organs and other substances of human origin;14 
clinical trials regulation; protection of privacy of medical data; liability for harm from novel 
health technologies; recognition of medical qualifications; intellectual property in 
biotechnological inventions; food safety, labelling, and traceability; and, infamously, tobacco 
regulation and advertising are all subject to harmonised Union law. 15 Such law-making based 
on creative interpretations of the Union competences does not take place without at least the 
possibility of judicial oversight, either because parties are dissatisfied with process (as, for 
instance, the case with the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 
which was adopted only with Parliamentary consultation) or outcome (as, for instance, the case 
with the Tobacco Advertising Directive, which prohibited advertising services where there was 
no link to creating or sustaining the internal market). But judicial review does not necessarily 




2. Dynamic potential of the current law 
 
Those features of laws dynamic potential (its contextualised, constructed, interpreted nature; 
the phenomenon of politics getting ahead of the law; its amenability to strategic litigation; an 
open approach to judicial review), pertain today. The legal texts in the Treaty for health law 
and policy look restrictive, in terms of the Unions competence to create a European health 
Union, but actually they are amenable, if the political will is present. The Union powers to 
incentivise, encourage, support, coordinate and resource activities in the health field are 
significant in this regard. Most laws are intended to incentivise particular behaviour. Although 
in most understandings the power to create incentivising legislation in Article 168 TFEU 
might have been seen as a relative non-binding and inconsequential, who is to say 
incentivising cannot entail carrot and stick-type laws. In the context of COVID-19, for 
                                               
13 S Garben, Competence Creep Revisited (2019) 57 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 205. Garben 
describes at least 6 forms in which competence creep may take place, which all take place in areas where 
Member States have retained authority (Articles 2-6 TFEU). 
14 See for a broad discussion and case references Hervey and McHale, 2015, (n 2) 364. 
15 We refer here to an intricate regulatory space with intensive legal developments within EU case law See eg. 
Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR I-8419. And for further 
discussions see e.g Hervey & McHale 2015 (n 2) 71-124, including the patients and the medical products cross-
border dynamics. Also see A. de Ruijter 2019  (n 2) 63-90 
 8 
example, the Union may lawfully support work towards collaborative research into vaccines, 
treatments, new medical equipment; epidemiological research into the spread of the disease; 
and social sciences research into its economic, political, social, cultural and other 
consequences. The Union has power to pool medical professional capacities, to develop 
capacities in regions or specialisms which are lagging, to secure the benefits of digital 
technologies in health fields, or to bargain with the pharmaceutical industry in procuring 
vaccines or medicines. Many of these ideas are part of the European Commissions proposal 
on an EU4Health Programme 2021-27.  
 
Despite the apparent restriction on harmonisation, the Union has power to adopt binding laws 
that have the effect of improving health, so long as those measures remove obstacles to trade 
or prevent appreciable distortions of competition. Union laws in many policy areas, including 
trade, consumer protection, agriculture, and security, must protect and promote health. And as 
outlined, the Unions powers to incentivise Member State action to protect and improve 
human health and in particular to combat the major health scourges is untested. The Union has 
a range of incentives under its control, and can offer access to resources, collectively held 
equipment, human resources, pooled expertise or knowledge, administrative capacity or 
information, or the Unions geo-political capital. Taken together, as a web of competence,16 
these powers will go a long way to create a European health Union. 
 
3. The dark side of EU health laws dynamic potential 
 
So far, we have considered the dynamic potential of Union health law as a benefit, a positive 
and a force for improving human health in the Union, and potentially beyond. Deployed 
creatively, the Unions legal powers in health domains have been, and can be, used in that way. 
The Union has developed its health laws and policies in ways which include all stakeholders, 
including patients, health professionals, the biomedical research community, public health 
specialists, health system institutions, and governmental bodies. Where many eyes are on 
legal or policy proposals, particularly where that scrutiny represents expert knowledge from 
the logics of human health, rather than the logics of trade relations, we increase the chances of 
beneficial policy outcomes.  
                                               
16 KP Purnhagen, M Flear, T Hervey, A Herwig. A de Ruijter, More Competences than You Knew? The Web 
of Health Competences for Union Action in Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak [2020] European Journal of 
Risk Regulation 1. 
 9 
 
Two constitutional problems arise from using the opportunities that are offered by the primary 
legal text in the Treaty for the creation of health law and policy. The first is procedural and the 
second is substantive. Procedurally, as a result of health being a side issue to other policies, 
competence creep can create a democratic problem, that has been well-described in European 
Union (legal) studies.17 But substantively, for health specifically there is a constitutional 
problem, where a competence to act in other policy areas (indirect legislation), such as the 
internal market or agriculture is used to create public health protections of health care 
entitlements. The Tobacco advertising saga and the Cross-Border Health Care Directive are 
prime examples of this phenomenon.18 In health then, the problem for legitimacy is not so 
much the democratic safeguards, but rather that there are no limits to Union competence as 
these are formulated in Article 168 (5)(7), when legislation is based on wider, more 
undetermined areas of legal competence such as Article 114 TFEU (internal market).19 
 
For the content of Union health law and policy this presents a dark side when the dynamic 
potential for health law and policy making is fully exploited without a sense for the 
constitutional stakes at play: Using indirect legislation constrains the consideration of the full 
spectrum of rights and values that are involved in health law and policy generally at Member 
State level.20 Furthermore it changes the institutional actors around the table, that might not 
have a full grasp of the substantive issues and health related fundamental rights at stake. Health 
law and policy is a highly complex system of regulated markets, self-organization and expert 
policy at Member State level. Furthermore, it is a politically sensitive policy area, putting 
another policy expert on the table can have the effect of the proverbial elephant in the china 
cabinet, as the negotiations around the Patients Rights Directive exemplified. 21   
 
                                               
17 There is a long line of scholars working on the EUs democratic deficit, we name a few:  Curtin, Civil 
Society and the European Union: Opening Spaces for Deliberative Democracy, Collected Courses of the 
Academy of European Law (1997); A Moravcsik, In Defence of the Democratic Deficit Reassessing 
Legitimacy in the European Union (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 603; Marija Bartl, The Way 
We Do Europe: Subsidiarity and The Democratic Deficit (2015) 21 European Law Journal 23; D Grimm, The 
Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case (2015) 21 European Law Journal 460. 
18 A de Ruijter, The Impediment of Health Laws Values in the Constitutional Setting of the EU in TK Hervey,  
CA Young and L Bishop (eds), Research Handbook on EU Health Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 2017); A de 
Ruijter, EU Integration in the Field of Human Health, Review Article [2016] Journal of European Integration. 
19 Garben (n 13). 
20 G Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 63. (subsidiarity as a tool for EU integration is a matter of assessing the effectiveness of law 
in view of a particular (legislative) objective, rather than balancing values).  
21 de Ruijter, (n 2). 
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Furthermore, its legally loose base may turn Union law and policy in a tool for political capture.  
The tobacco industry, for example, has used (Union) law to seek to secure access to new 
markets, particularly of young people, and particularly for novel products. The pharmaceutical 
industry has sought to undermine European pharmaceutical pricing approaches deployed by 
Member States to keep negotiated prices relatively low for their national health systems. For 
sure, it remains important to pay attention to who might deploy law to challenge Union 
competence to act in the creation of a European health Union, and how they might do so.   The 
locus to bring judicial review claims before the CJEU is quite restrictive (although privileged 
applicants such as the European Parliament or Member States enjoy such locus); but judicial 
review may also be brought by private actors before national courts, and from there a 
preliminary reference to CJEU is possible. And the direct effect of Union law means that it can 
be relied upon in litigation by private actors. 
 
At the same time, much of the detail of Union health law and policy lies in technocratic 
decision-making, at agency level, through committee processes or through private standards 
bodies. Here is where decisions about safety of medicines, devices and equipment, chemicals 
and other components; about permissibility of clinical trials; about food safety, contents, and 
labelling; about environmental effects on health; and a host more are made. Much more than 
the high-profile, broad-brush legislation, these are where the specifics about the European ways 
of thinking about health - especially public health - are embedded into dense regulatory 
structures.  This is where, for example, the Unions precautionary principle is instrumentalised 
in practice. 
 
European Union law and policy making has not always been successful in protecting and 
promoting human health through such processes and mechanisms, partially given that its hands 
were tied legally, but also due to a lack of political will, capacity and knowledge.22 The 
decision-making under the common agricultural policy did not prevent the BSE scandal. 
Oversight by standards bodies did not prevent the PiP breast implants scandal. The ECDC 
failed to protect Italy, and other Union countries, from the ravages of COVID-19. One of the 
key roles of law in the Unions constitutionalised structures is to secure accountability and 
legitimacy of decision-making. This can mean through compensation for harm, through 
mandating transparency and accounting for decisions made, perhaps with political 
                                               
22 See de Ruijter (n 2). 
 11 
consequences including being relieved of public office. This is the case as much for 
technocratic decision-making as it is for high-level legislative decision-making.  
 
To be sure, matters related to human health are rarely only technocratic matters. Technocratic 
decision-making may be appropriate where a matter is truly only technical, but not so much for 
matters where there are ethical or other similar dimensions. There constitutional legitimacy 
requires parliamentary or other representative and/or stakeholder oversight as well as 
consistency with fundamental human rights. The dynamic potential of the Unions  
constitutional and institutional legal frameworks hides a dark side: the possibilities for 




The dynamic potential of law represents an opportunity for creating a European health Union, 
if the political will is there to do so.  We have argued that such competence is necessary, but 
not sufficient, to create the kind of European health Union that is consistent with the Unions 
self-proclaimed values, and the human rights it promises to protect.23  Health law and policy is 
an area of human order that is highly tied-in with specific bioethical values related to disease; 
the beginning and end of life; even human identity itself. These are values such as human 
dignity, equality and solidarity, that are protected at Member State level and Union and Council 
of Europe level in various legal documents and in European case law. It is this sensitivity of 
the particular nature of health law and policy that should give us even more caution. For the 
European Union, we need to ensure that moving forward, we avoid the risks associated with 
relatively unfettered powers. We must make sure that legitimacy mechanisms including 
stakeholder scrutiny, parliamentary oversight and access to justice are also in place.  
 
                                               
23 See, eg, Article 2 TEU; The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ 2012 C 26/391; 
European Council Conclusions on Common values and principles in European Union Health Systems OJ 2006C 
146/01. 
 
